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FAIR DIVISION AND REDISTRICTING
ZEPH LANDAU AND FRANCIS EDWARD SU
1. Introduction
Redistricting is the political practice of dividing states into electoral districts
of equal population. It is mandated to occur every ten years, after the census,
to ensure equal representation in the legislative body. Where the boundaries are
drawn can dramatically alter the number of districts a given political party can
win. As a result, a political party which has control over the legislature, can
(and does) manipulate the boundaries to win a larger number of districts, thus
affecting the balance of power in the U.S. House of Representatives. This kind of
boundary manipulation occurs even with certain legal and legislative constraints
that restrict some aspect of how districts can be drawn and mandate that, where
appropriate, districts should be created to have a majority of voters consisting of
a racial minority. (See [11] for a detailed summary of these constraints.)
The ability of one political party to gain political advantage by carefully choosing
the boundaries during redistricting has been recognized as a serious problem with
the redistricting process in the United States; we shall refer to this as the problem
of partisan unfairness. Attempts to fix and/or mitigate the problem of partisan
unfairness (beyond the legal restrictions) have taken one of two approaches: try-
ing to constrain the process to reduce the amount of political gain achievable, and
trying to remove politics from the redistricting process. Examples of the first ap-
proach include attempting to limit the power of the drawing party by more strictly
prescribing the allowable shapes of districts, and banning the use of registration
and voting data within the redistricting process. Examples of the second approach
include assigning the task of redistricting to bipartisan or non-partisan panels1,
and using computer programs to generate redistricting maps that optimize certain
carefully chosen criteria.
Landau-Reid-Yershov [6] took a different approach to provide a novel solution
to the problem of partisan unfairness: rather than trying to fix the problem by
restricting the shape of the possible maps or by assigning the power to draw the
map to nonbiased entities, their solution ensures fairness by balancing competing
interests against each other. This kind of solution is an example of what are known
as “fair division” solutions— such solutions account explicitly for the preferences of
all parties, are determined by a procedure in which all parties are actively involved,
and are accompanied by rigorous guarantees of a specified notion of fairness.
2000 Mathematics Subject Classification. Primary 91F10; Secondary 91B32, 91B12.
Research partially supported by NSF Grants DMS-0701308 and DMS-1002938 (Su).
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The goal of this article is to provide an exposition of this redistricting method
in the context of a detailed sample “map”, and make a stronger connection to the
ideas of fair division than is provided in [6]. In particular, we propose a specific
notion of fairness that was used but not made explicit in [6]. This notion of fairness
can be used in concert with (not substitute for) other necessary or desired criteria
for a good redistricting solution. We clarify how fair division ideas can play an
important role in a realistic redistricting solution by introducing an interactive step
that involves multilateral evaluation, procedural fairness, and fairness guarantees.
And by making the bridge between fair division ideas and redistricting solutions
more explicit, we hope to encourage the flow of ideas between the two areas.
We begin with an introduction to the ideas of fair division in Section 2. We
describe the problem of partisan unfairness in more detail in Section 3. Despite the
ability to easily recognize the “unfairness” inherent in the redistricting process, it
has been hard to give a reasonable definition of what would be fair. In Section 4
we give an explicit definition of fairness—the geometric target—that incorporates
geometric considerations such as how constituent voters are distributed and how
districts are shaped. Section 6 examines the protocol of [6] by analyzing its behavior
in a specific example that demonstrates most aspects of the solution. Within this
example, the fairness of the protocol is discussed in detail.
We stress that the ideas discussed here are well suited to be combined with
other necessary or desired criteria for a good redistricting solution. Our definition
of fairness involving geometric targets in Section 4 can incorporate independently
desired requirements for district shape or competitiveness. The protocol of [6] can
be easily adjusted to approximate fairness under these additional requirements. If a
solution involving an independent commission is desired, these definitions of fairness
can be used as a target for the commission. Similarly if a computer assisted solution
that consists of optimizing some function is sought, this measure of fairness can be
used as a component of the function to be optimized. Separately, the simple fair
division ranking protocol given in Section 5 can be used to incorporate some degree
of legislative preference within any proposed redistricting solution that otherwise
does not include legislative influence.
2. Fair Division
The problem of fair division, as Steinhaus put it [14] is essentially a question of
how to divide some object fairly. Usually, this object is affectionately referred to
as cake [12], but in general it could be desirable or undesirable (e.g., the division
of chores [9]) or a mixture of desirable and undesirable goods [15]. The cake may
be infinitely divisible (as we usually regard real cake) or only divisible into discrete
pieces (such as a pieces of an estate). Applications of fair division ideas include
methods for resolving international disputes and divorce settlements [3].
There are several notions of fairness that one might consider, but an important
aspect of fair division problems is that this fairness notion is evaluated by the parties
involved in the negotation, rather than an outside arbiter. Thus, the outcome of
a fair division procedure will give each party what it considers to be a fair share,
according to its own evaluation.
The simplest example of a fair division procedure is the familiar “I-cut-you-
choose” method for dividing a cake among two people. One might consider a fair
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piece in which each party does not envy the other; we call such a solution an envy-
free solution. Again, note that envy is measured by each party according to its
own evaluation. If one person cuts the cake (into two pieces that she is indifferent
between) and the other person is allowed to choose first (picking the piece that he
most desires), then both people will end up with a piece for which they experience no
envy. This simplest of all fair division procedures already highlights some interesting
features common to all fair division procedures:
(1) Multilateral evaluation. Fairness is evaluated according to each party’s own
preferences. Therefore, parties don’t have to agree on what is valuable; each
will obtain a share they would consider fair in their own estimation (and
they do not need to know the other party’s preferences).
(2) Procedural fairness. There is a process by which preferences are elicited,
all parties are involved in the process, and they understand the criteria
by which fairness is measured. Because of this, parties are more likely
to feel that the process is fair, more so than a decision imposed by an
outside arbiter (see e.g., [13]). The procedure guides parties to a mutually
acceptable division.
(3) Fairness guarantee. By following the procedure, as long as you tell the
truth about your preferences, you will obtain what you feel is fair (even if
everyone else lies). Thus there is an incentive to be truthful (and if you lie
about your preferences, it can backfire).
A reader might object to the above particular cake-division solution, because the
cutter only gets what he perceives to be 50 percent of the cake in his valuation, while
the other person might end up with more. The solution is envy-free (neither person
envies the other person’s share) but it is not equitable, meaning the perceived share
of cake each player gets (in his own valuation) is different. This is not a deficit of the
procedure (which only guaranteed envy-freeness and not equitability) as much as it
is a deficit of the procedure chosen. An active area of research in mathematics [12],
economics [7], and political science [3] is the development of fair division procedures
in various settings and with various fairness criteria.
A more interesting fair division solution that has found application by practi-
tioners is the Adjusted Winner procedure of Brams and Taylor [4]. It is procedure
for dividing a set of goods between two parties in such a way that the division
is: envy-free, equitable, and efficient (or Pareto-optimal). The last criterion means
that there is no division that dominates the given one, i.e., there is no other division
that is just as good for both parties and strictly better for one party. Thus the
Adjusted Winner solution gives each party a share for which they do not wish to
trade shares, and in which they feel they got just as good a portion as the other
party feels it got, and there is no other solution that dominates. At most one of
the goods may have to be divided in the procedure (though one cannot predict
beforehand which procedure it is). We note that if there are more than two parties,
it may not always be possible to satisfy these three properties in cake division, as
discussed in [2].
The Adjusted Winner procedure has found application in divorce settlements [4]
because of its fairness guarantees as well as its ease of use. In the procedure, both
parties are given 100 points to divide by assigning over the objects. This is the part
of the procedure where preferences are elicited. Then objects are initially given to
the party that valued them most; such a division is efficient, but it may not be
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envy-free or equitable. Call the party who ends up with the largest fractional share
(in its own evaluation) the winner, and the other, the loser. In the next phase of
the procedure, the assignment of goods is “adjusted” by transferring goods from
the winner to the other party in a particular order until both fractional shares are
equalized.
The Adjusted Winner procedure has the 3 features described above for a fair
division procedure. It has a fairness guarantee: what results is an outcome that
is provably envy-free and efficient, in addition to being equitable. It relies on
mutilateral evaluation: the preferences of both parties are taken into account, and
the resulting division achieves the fairness guarantee for both parties using their own
estimation. And it is procedurally fair: parties using the Adjusted Winner procedure
can understand and verify the fairness guarantees for a particular solution (without
having to understand the proofs); because they participated in the procedure by
stating their preferences, they are more likely to feel that the outcome is fair.
As we shall see, these three fair division ideas can offer some helpful ideas to
current thinking about redistricting which can be combined with other desired
ideas for a good redistricting solution. They underlie the redistricting procedure
of [6] that we will now explain. First, we will explain the problem of partisan
unfairness that [6] attempts to address.
3. Redistricting: the problem of partisan unfairness
In most of the 50 states in the U.S., the districting protocol is to have one party
draw all the boundaries. If the drawing party’s goal is to win as many districts as
it can, the strategy is clear: draw boundaries so that each district either a) has a
small majority of its voters, or b) has a large majority of the other party’s voters.
In other words, for any district, the drawing party should strive to either win it by
a small margin or lose it by a large margin (See [1] for a detailed discussion).
In general, with such a strategy, a drawing party with X% of support of the
voters can win just under min(2X%, 100%) of the districts if there are no geomet-
ric constraints (e.g., requiring districts be compact or contiguous, etc.). In reality,
geometric constraints usually mean that this ideal outcome cannot be achieved;
however, in most cases, the drawing party can still win a significantly larger per-
centage than X% of the districts, even with only partial knowledge of voting trends.
This is not just a theoretical issue, as has often been demonstrated when the
party in control changes. We cite two examples:
• When Republicans took control of the Texas legislature in 2002, they re-
drew state districts mid-decade, and the Texas delegation changed from 15
Republicans and 17 Democrats to 22 Republicans and 10 Democrats. [8]
• In Michigan, the 2000 election produced 7 Republican representatives and 9
Democratic representatives. After the census, a new district map was drawn
resulting in 9 Republican representatives and 6 Democratic representatives
in the 2002 election (Michigan lost 1 seat due to the census).[8]
This ability of one party to draw districts in such a way as to gain political
advantage is viewed as one of the major problems with redistricting in the United
States; we shall refer to this as the problem of partisan unfairness. The districting
protocol proposed in [6] avoids this inherent unfairness by ensuring that either party
can win a percentage of districts that is very close to their fair share.
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4. What is a party’s fair share?
Defining a “fair” share is not as straightforward as it may seem. A reasonable
first attempt would be to say that the percentage of districts won by a party should
be close to the percentage of constituent voters in the party. However, geometric
constraints can make this impossible. For instance, if one party enjoys a statewide
60% - 40% advantage in the electorate and if the parties are mixed homogeneously
throughout the state, then any reasonable district would have a similar 60% -
40% advantage for the same party. In such a case, if we believe that districts
should contain people who live in contiguous and relatively compact regions, then
all districts would go to the majority party and we would consider this outcome
fair even though it differed dramatically from the percentage of constituent voters.
This example demonstrates the need to incorporate geometric constraints into any
reasonable notion of fair shares.
It may come as a surprise that such a fairness notion can be defined, despite the
complexity of possible geometric constraints. In this section, we define a fairness
notion that incorporates geometric considerations such as how constituent voters
are distributed and how districts are shaped. Before doing so, we make some
preliminary definitions.
Any division of a state into districts that satisfies all desirable constraints (in-
cluding legal constraints that district maps are subject to) will be called a viable
division. The voting outcome Vout is a description of how every voter actually votes
in a given election. Any party with a role in redistricting attempts to predict as-
pects of Vout to guide their choices of district boundaries. A voting model V shall
be such a prediction of how every voter will vote.
A party’s rating system R is an assignment of a number to any proposed viable
division of a state that gives a measure of how desirable that viable division is. A
simple example of a rating system is to rate a viable division by the number of
districts the party thinks it can win; we will denote this rating system by Rwin.
Implicit in calculating Rwin is a voting model V that the party is using to predict
which districts it will win.
In reality, a party’s interests may be much more complicated then just the num-
ber of districts that it wins. A more general rating system is one where a party
could rate the desirability of each district in a division (assigning it a number), then
sum these numbers over all the districts to give a rating for the division. As in [6],
we shall refer to such a rating sytem as an additive rating system, and denote any
particular instance of it as Rsum. The rating system Rwin is a special case of Rsum
in which a party assigns a 1 to districts it expects to win and a 0 to those it expects
to lose.
The more general rating system Rsum allows a party to take other considera-
tions into account. Politically, these can be important, as the following examples
demonstrate:
• perhaps some district has an incumbent who is on an important congres-
sional committee, so winning that district is more valuable to the party
(hence rated higher than other winnable districts),
• perhaps some district has an important landmark (a stadium or a construc-
tion project) worth more to a party than some other district,
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• perhaps some district encompasses the supporters of two incumbents from
the opposition party, so that even though the district will be lost, the
elimination of one strong incumbent from the other party is valuable.
Equipped with the notions of viable division, voting model, and rating system,
we can now define our fairness notion:
Definition (Geometric Target). Given a voting model V and a rating system R,
a party’s geometric target with respect to V and R is the average of its highest and
lowest ratings among the set of viable divisions. A party’s geometric target with
respect to Vout and Rwin will be called the absolute geometric target.
The absolute geometric target is a definition of fairness that takes into account
geometric constraints. There are several compelling reasons why this is a good
definition. First, the definition seems conceptually fair as it lies exactly between
the best and worst outcome (in terms of number of districts won) for each party.
Second, when there are no geometric constraints, the absolute geometric target
coincides with the percentage of constituent voters—as already mentioned, if the
minority party has X% of the vote, its best outcome is to win about 2X% of the
districts, while its worst outcome is to lose all the districts 0% and so the absolute
geometric target in this case would be approximately 2X+0
2
= X% of the districts.
Third, because this definition uses only viable district maps, it incorporates geo-
metric constraints by restricting attention to realizable outcomes. For instance, in
the example at the beginning of this section (with the homogeneous 60% - 40%
electorate split), both the best and worst rating for the minority party would be to
win 0 districts which is the only possible outcome (and thus fair) in that case. We
remark that the absolute geometric target could be used as a target for fairness for
independent commissions.
The protocol for districting proposed in [6] (and described subsequently), allows
each party the opportunity to achieve an outcome that is close to their own absolute
geometric target. Moreover, it allows each party the opportunity to achieve an
outcome that is close to a geometric target with respect to any voting model V and
any additive rating system R.
Note that the geometric target with respect to a voting model V and a rating
system R is a notion that captures the fair division principle of multilateral evalua-
tion: that party preferences should be taken into account. Each party has its own
geometric target, based on its own voting model V and rating system R(derived
from its preferences). This is to be distinguished from any absolute notions of fair-
ness that might be imposed by an external arbiter (including the absolute geometric
target).
We shall soon see that districting protocol of [6] will, in addition, possess the
other features of a fair division procedure— procedural fairness, and a fairness
guarantee (see Section 2).
5. The ranking protocol
Before presenting the redistricting protocol of [6], we present a simple but useful
protocol, which we call the ranking protocol, for how two parties can decide on one
of a bunch of outcomes. For our purposes, the setting will be that of two political
parties, A and B, where the choice of outcomes are different proposed divisions of
a state. The protocol is then simple: both parties rank the proposed divisions from
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best to worst from their perspective. Each proposed division then has two rankings.
Select the proposed division whose worse ranking is best (this reflects the Rawls’
maximin criterion, as discussed in [10]). If there are 2 such proposals (there can be
at most 2), randomly choose one.
Notice that if there are n proposed divisions, the division chosen is guaranteed to
be in the top n
2
+ 1 of both lists. Said another way, the ranking protocol provides
an outcome that, for either party, is no worse than one less than their median
outcome among the choices (and can be much better if the two parties desires are
not diametrically opposed). As we shall see in the next section, the ranking protocol
is used as an augmentation step for the core redistricting protocol of [6].
We point out more generally that the ranking protocol could be used with any
proposed method for generating divisions of a state, be it divisions created by
independent panels, computers, or based on any kind of optimization scheme.
6. The fair division redistricting protocol
We now describe the core protocol for redistricting that was presented in [6]. It
will involve three parties: two parties with vested interest in the division (e.g. the
democratic and republican parties, or the majority and minority party in a state)
called parties A and B, and an independent agent which we’ll refer to as I.
The formal precise description of the protocol can be found in [6]; here we will
describe the protocol while working through an example that will illustrate many
of the aspects of both the protocol and the resulting solution.
6.1. The State. Consider the map in Figure 1, which represents a state consisting
of 25 parcels, which we are thinking of as indivisible units (here, they are rectangles
or squares). Each parcel contains the same number of people; thus the smaller the
parcel, the denser the population. Loosely, we can think of this state as having a city
located at the small rectangles (T,U,V,W,X,Y), with suburban areas surrounding
the city, and the remaining areas rural.
Suppose our goal is to divide this state into 5 districts, each containing exactly
5 parcels.
Y
B C D
E F G H
I J K L M
A
N
O P Q
R S
T U V
W X
Figure 1. Sample map of districts.
Suppose that the voting outcome (Vout) of the ensuing election is given by Figure
2, which shows in each parcel the percentage of votes that party A receives.
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Figure 2. Vote totals by district.
The ability to use the redistricting process to gain political advantage relies on
the ability to predict some features of Vout. In general, of course, Vout is not known
precisely at the time districts are being re-drawn. However, the combination of
data from previous elections and opinion polling increasingly gives a more and
more accurate model of how votes will be distributed. For the purposes of this
example we will assume that the working voting model V of both parties coincides
with Vout in Figure 2. In this example, party A has a slim statewide majority,
receiving 50.12% of the total vote.
For this particular example, we will assume that the only thing the two parties
care about is maximizing the number of districts they can win; thus their preferences
are diametrically opposed with each having rating system Rwin. We emphasize that
this is an assumption we make for this example but that the protocol is designed
to work under much more general preferences—the additive ratings system Rsum,
discussed earlier.
Notice that even though parties A and B each have approximately half the
voters over the state, if either party is given complete control of the district-drawing
process, they can draw districts so that they are the majority in 4 of the 5 districts.
See Figure 3. In this example, the absolute geometric target for either party is
1+4
2
= 2.5 districts.
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Figure 3. The left diagram shows a division in which A can win
4 districts. The right diagram shows a division in which B can win
4 districts. Districts that A wins are shaded.
6.2. The Protocol. There are three core steps to the redistricting protocol along
with an augmenting fourth step. After outlining them in general, we will work
through each step in the above example.
• Split Sequence Generation. This step is performed by the independent
agent I. The agent generates a sequence of so-called k-splits: a k-split is
a division of the state into two pieces (piece 1 and piece 2) such that the
population within piece 1 totals the number of people in k districts. The
independent agent I generates a split sequence: a 1-split, a 2-split, a 3-split,
etc. with each split building on the previous so that piece 1 of the j-split
contains piece 1 of the (j − 1)-split for all j.
• Preference. For each of the k-splits, the two parties are each asked which
of the following options they would prefer:
(1) to have party A divide piece 1 of the split into k districts and have
party B divide piece 2 into n−k districts (where n is the total number
of districts).
(2) to have party B divide piece 1 of the split into k districts and have
party A divide piece 2 into n− k districts.
Each party has the option of saying that they are indifferent to the two
choices2.
• Resolution. If there exists an i-split such that parties A and B both prefer
the same option in the preference step above then create a map using that
option. If there exists an i-split such that one party is indifferent, then
create a map using the option selected by the party that was not indifferent.
If there exists an i-split such that both parties are indifferent, then create
a map by randomly choosing one of the options for that i-split.
If none of the above scenarios occur it means that the parties have oppo-
site preferences for each i. Find the first i0, 1 ≤ i0 ≤ n− 2 for which party
A prefers option (2) for i = i0 and switches preferences to option (1) when
i = i0 + 1. (This scenario is guaranteed to occur at least once since party
2This additional option is a modification of the original protocol in [6].
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A prefers option (2) when i = 1 and prefers option (1) when i = n − 1.)
Randomly choose to divide the state from the following four prescriptions:
i. use option (1) for the i0-split,
ii. use option (2) for i0-split,
iii. use option (1) for (i0 + 1)-split,
iv. use option (2) for (i0 + 1)-split.
• Augmentation. We perform the above 3 steps for a number of different
split sequences to produce a number of divisions of the state. We then
use the ranking protocol of Section 5 to choose among these maps, i.e.
each party ranks the divisions (from best to worst) according to their own
preferences, and the division whose worst ranking (among both parties) is
highest is the one that is chosen. If there are two such splits, select one of
them at random.
6.3. The protocol in action. We now show how the protocol works for the ex-
ample described in Figure 2.
Split Sequence Generation step. Suppose the Split Generation step yields the
split sequence in Figure 4. In each diagram piece 1 will be the left piece and piece
2 will be the right piece.
Figure 4. Split sequence generation. From left to right, a 1-split,
2-split, 3-split, 4-split.
Preference step. For the 1-split, we exhibit in Figure 5 a possible way each party
can optimize its own interests in each of the two options. In option (1), A divides
piece 1 and B divides piece 2. In option (2), B divides piece 1 and A divides piece
2.
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Figure 5. Two options for the 1-split. The first diagram is option
(1): in which A divides the left piece and B divides the right piece.
The second diagram is option (2) in which B divides the left piece
and A divides the right piece.
Thus party A would prefer option (2) (since it would win 4 out of 5 districts)
and party B would prefer option (1) (since it would win 4 out of 5 districts). This
is not surprising since there is no opportunity to gerrymander the left piece.
We then consider the same question for the 2-split. Figure 6 shows one possible
way each party can optimize its own interests in each of the two options. Here,
party A will still prefer option (2) and party B would still prefer option (1).
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Figure 6. Two options for the 2-split. The first diagram is option
(1): in which A divides the left piece and B divides the right piece.
The second diagram is option (2) in which B divides the left piece
and A divides the right piece.
For the 3-split, Figure 7 shows one possible way each party can optimize its own
interests in each of the two options. Notice that now the parties preferences have
changed: party A now prefers (1) and party B prefers (2).
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Figure 7. Two options for the 3-split. The first diagram is option
(1): in which A divides the left piece and B divides the right piece.
The second diagram is option (2) in which B divides the left piece
and A divides the right piece.
Finally, for the 4-split, Figure 8 shows one possible way each party can optimize
its own interests in each of the two options. Again, party A prefers (1) and party
B prefers (2).
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Figure 8. Two options for the 4-split. The first diagram is option
(1): in which A divides the left piece and B divides the right piece.
The second diagram is option (2) in which B divides the left piece
and A divides the right piece.
We summarize the results from party A’s point of view in the following table:
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Table 1. The number of districts A wins on the left/right sides
of split and total.
option (1): left/right=total option (2): left/right = total
1-split 1/1=2 1/3=4
2-split 1/1=2 1/2=3
3-split 3/0=3 1/1=2
4-split 4/0=4 1/0=1
With all the preferences now stated, we are ready to move to the final step of
the protocol.
Resolution Step. Since the two parties prefer different options in each of the
four splits, we find the point at which party A’s preference switches; here it occurs
between the 2-split and the 3-split. Thus i0 = 2 and we randomly choose between
the four prescriptions corresponding to the options listed in the second and third
row of Table 1.
i. option (1) for the 2-split with the result: party A wins 2 districts, party B
wins 3.
ii. option (2) for the 2-split with the result: party A wins 3 districts, party B
wins 2.
iii. option (1) for the 3-split with the result: party A wins 3 districts, party B
wins 2.
iv. option (2) for the 3-split with the result: party A wins 2 districts, party B
wins 3.
Notice that these results have party A winning either 40% or 60% of the districts,
the two closest achievable percentages to both the percentage of votes for party A
(50.12%) and the percentage of districts given by the absolute geometric target
(2.5/5 = 50%). This is the result that the protocol is designed to produce; it
is argued in [6] that a rigorous result establishing a good choice property of the
protocol combined with the way i0 is chosen will result in this kind of behavior for
most choice of split sequences. We discuss this in the next section.
Augmentation Step. For our example, we run the same protocol for the following
four additional split sequences:
Figure 9. Vertical Split Sequence.
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Figure 10. Horizontal Split Sequence.
Figure 11. Diagonal Split Sequence 1.
Figure 12. Diagonal Split Sequence 2.
These have the following outcomes from party A’s perspective, listed in Table 2.
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Table 2. The number of districts A wins in piece 1, piece 2, and total.
option (1): pc.1/pc.2 = total option (2): pc.1/pc.2 = total
Vertical Split
1-split 1/1=2 1/3=4
2-split 1/1=2 1/2=3
3-split 2/0=2 1/1=2
4-split 4/0=4 1/0=1
Horizontal Split
1-split 0/1=1 0/4=4
2-split 0/2=2 0/3=3
3-split 2/1=3 1/2=3
4-split 3/0=3 1/0=1
Diagonal Split 1
1-split 0/1=1 0/3=3
2-split 1/1=2 0/3=3
3-split 2/1=3 1/2=3
4-split 3/0=3 1/0=1
Diagonal Split 2
1-split 1/1=2 1/3=4
2-split 2/0=2 2/2=4
3-split 3/0=3 2/1=3
4-split 4/0=4 1/0=1
Unlike the first split sequence from Figure 4 that we explored in detail, the
result of each of these split sequences is that the parties will be indifferent to one
split. Here are possible maps from the results of the protocol for each of these split
sequences:
.65 .65.59
.59 .59 .65
.41
.41
.41
.41
.41
.53 .53 .53
.53
.53
.53.53
.35
.47
.47
.47
.35
.47
.47
.65 .65.59
.59 .59 .65
.41
.41
.41
.41
.41
.53 .53 .53
.53
.53
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.35
.47
.47
.47
.35
.47
.47
Figure 13. Outcomes for Vertical Split Sequence.
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Figure 14. Outcomes for Horizontal Split Sequence.
.65 .65.59
.59 .59 .65
.41
.41
.41
.41
.41
.53 .53 .53
.53
.53
.53.53
.35
.47
.47
.47
.35
.47
.47
.65 .65.59
.59 .59 .65
.41
.41
.41
.41
.41
.53 .53 .53
.53
.53
.53.53
.35
.47
.47
.47
.35
.47
.47
Figure 15. Outcomes for Diagonal Split Sequence 1.
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Figure 16. Outcomes for Diagonal Split Sequence 2.
In the ranking protocol, both parties would rank the 5 different outcomes from
best to worst. Depending on the outcome of the random choice of prescription
for the first split sequence (Figure 4), the outcomes would be party A winning 3
districts 3 or 4 times (Horizontal Split sequence, both Diagonal split sequences,
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and possibly the first split sequence), and winning 2 districts 1 or 2 times (Vertical
split sequence, and possibly the first split sequence). Since the result of the ranking
protocol will result in one of the top three outcomes for both parties, in this case,
the final outcome will be party A winning 3 districts and party B winning 2. We
remark that this resolution is as close as one can get to both the absolute geometric
target (2.5) and the proportion of constituent voters (50.12 %)
6.4. Fairness qualities of the protocol. Having explained the protocol we turn
to a discussion of why the protocol is fair. We will analyze the protocol from the
point of view of party A; the identical analysis can be made for party B. We address
the following two questions:
• If the map is created from a choice party A preferred or was indifferent to,
will it be fair for party A?
• What if the randomness in the algorithm results in a choice party A did not
prefer?
The first question is answered in the affirmative by establishing that the protocol
has the good choice property [6]. Approximately, the good choice property says that
if party A is using a voting model V and has an additive rating system R, there
will be a choice for party A that achieves an outcome that is at least as good as a
number close to the geometric target for V and R (see Section 4 for definitions).
Precisely, for a given k-split define the party’s k-split geometric target for V and R
to be the average rating of the best and worst outcomes over all viable divisions
that include the dividing line of the k-split. Then the good choice property is:
Theorem 6.1 (Good Choice Property [6]). For any voting model V and rating
system R, one of the choices given in the protocol achieves an outcome that is at
least as good as the party’s k-split geometric target for V and R.
For our example above party A has been acting according to its interests with
V = Vout and R = Rwin. The good choice property follows from the following
observation that is perhaps best seen pictorially (see Figure 17): given a particular
k-split, the average of the number of districts won by party A under options (1)
and (2) is equal to the average of the number of districts that party A wins if it
had complete control (which would result in the best outcome for party A) and if
it had no control (which would result in an outcome no worse than the worst for
party A).
Thus at least one of the two options is better than the average outcome between
the best and worst scenario for party A, which is precisely the definition of the
k-split geometric target when V = Vout and R = Rwin. It should be clear that the
same argument holds regardless of choice of V and additive rating system R.
The astute reader will notice that the k-split geometric target for V and R can
differ from the geometric target for V and R; in other words, insisting that the
division includes the boundary given by the k-split can penalize one party. Two
observation suggest that should this happen, the penalty will not be large. First,
the choice of split is made by an independent (neutral) third party and thus should
be no more biased against one party than a random choice. Second, in the case
where there are no geometric constraints (see [6]), the absolute geometric target
and the k-split geometric target for Vout and Rwin can differ by at most
1
2
. In
our example, we see this difference between the k-split geometric target and the
absolute geometric target: for party A, in the 3-split in Vertical Split sequence, and
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Best for A
Worst for A
Worst for A
Best for A
Best for A Worst for A
Worst for A Best for A
Figure 17. The good choice property.
for party B, in the 3-splits on the final three split sequences of the protocol. In
each of these cases, however, the difference from the absolute geometric target is
as small as it could be: 1
2
. It is reasonable to assume that most splits will either
not particularly favor either party, or favor a party by a small amount. It is then
the augmentation step of the protocol that ensures that a rare “bad” split for a
particular party will not come into play (since the affected party would put such a
split towards the bottom of their rankings).
We see therefore, that the good choice property, when coupled with the aug-
mented protocol, implies that party A should be satisfied if the division is created
by an option that it chose.
We now turn to the second question—how party A will fare if the randomness
in the algorithm results in a choice they did not prefer. The randomness is im-
plemented only if for each i-split, the two parties have opposite preferences (for
instance in the first split sequence described in Figure 4). We suppose the random
prescription in the Resolution Step (see Section 6.2) is one not preferred by party
A, for instance prescription (i.) in the Resolution step (i.e. option (1) for i = i0).
In our example, this would correspond to i0 = 2 in the first split sequence. Party
A, however, prefered option (2): to divide piece 2 and have party B divide piece
1. Notice, however, that party A would prefer to divide up piece 1 in the i0 + 1
split, and this piece 1 only differs from the piece 1 of the i0 split by a small region
with a population equal to the size of a single district. (Similarly piece 2 in the i0
and i0 + 1 splits only differ by this same small region). Because party A prefers
option (2) for the i0 split and option (1) for the i0+1 split (and because piece 1 of
these two splits do not differ by very much), it is reasonable to expect that party
A’s preference for option (2) over option (1) for the i0 split is mild. (In our exam-
ple, this is indeed the case as party A achieves an outcome of winning 2 districts
which is of minimal negative deviation from the absolute geometric target of 2.5).
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If indeed this is the case, then party A’s discontent with the division would only
be mild as we have shown (by the good choice property) that party A would have
been satisfied with the slightly better option of (2).
Even though the first pieces of the two splits differ by a small amount, one can
construct scenarios where that small amount makes a big difference. However, recall
that the creation of the splits was done by an independent party and therefore one
would expect this type of scenario to be rare. Again, choosing to use the augmented
protocol would ensure that this rare scenario would not occur in the division chosen.
7. Conclusion
Replacing current redistricting procedures with the protocol presented here surely
presents substantial political obstacles. It has been observed numerous times (e.g.,
see [5]) that any proposed change should be structured to take effect far enough in
the future so that it could not be interpreted as a power grab by one party. However,
as noted in the last paragraph of the introduction, some of the ideas presented here
could be incorporated into current processes without requiring a complete overhaul
of the redistricting process.
In this article, we have used a detailed example to explore the redistricting pro-
tocol of [6]. We have shown how this procedure retains the usual constraints that
may be desirable to impose on a redistricting solution, while incorporating some of
the best features of a fair division procedure: multilateral evaluation, procedural
fairness, and fairness guarantees. Procedural fairness is apparent in the protocol,
the geometric targets incorporate multilateral evaluation, and the ability to ensure
outcomes near geometric targets provides the fairness guarantee. The result is a so-
lution that accounts for both parties having different interests, involves a resolution
process and an interactive protocol to elicit preferences, and provides mathematical
confidence that the outcome will be fair.
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